Evidence as Opinions of Experts

Introduction
Many problems in artificial intelligence call for assessments of degrees of belief in propositions based on evidence gathered from disparate sources. It is often claimed that probabilistic analysis of propositions is at variance with intuitive notions of belief [1, 2, 3] . Various methods have been introduced to reconcile the discrepancies, but no single technique has settled the issue on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds.
One method for attempting to modify probabilistic analysis of propositions is the Dempster/Shafer "Theory of Evidence." This theory is derived from notions of upper and lower probabilities, as developed by Dempster in (4] . The idea that intervals instead of probability values can be used to model degrees of belief had been suggested and investigated by earlier researchers [5, 6, 2, 7] , but Dempster's work defines the upper and lower points of tb:: intervals in terms of statistics on set-valued functions defined over a measure space. The result is a collection of intervals defined for subsets of a fixed labeling set, and a combination formula for combining collections of intervals.
, Dempster explained in greater detail how these notions could be used to assess beliefs on propositions in [8] . The topic was taken up by Shafer [9, 10] , ·and led to publication of a monograph on the "Theory of Evidence," [11] . All of these works after [8] emphasize the values assigned to subsets of propositions (the "beliefs"), and the combination formulas, and de-emphasize the connection to the statistical foundations based on the set-valued functions on a measure space. This paper will return to the original formulation by Dempster in [8] to relate the statistical foundations of the Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence to notions of beliefs on propositions.
This paper has three main points. First, we show that the combination rule for the Dcmpster/Shafer theory of evidence may be simplified by omiting the normalization term. We next point out that the individual pairs of experts involved in the combination formula can be regarded as performing Bayesian updating. Finally, we present extensions to the theory, based on allowing experts to express probabilistic opinions and assuming that the logarithms of experts' opinions over the set of labels arc multi-normally distributed.
:Z.
The Rule of Combination and Normalization
The purpose of this section is to show how one can dispense with the normalization term in the Dempster rule of combination.
The set of possible outcomes, or labclings, will be denoted in this paper by A. This set is the "frame of discernment", and in other works has been denoted, variously, by n, 6, or S. For convenience, we will assume that A is a finite set with n elements, although the framework could easily be extended to continuous label sets. More importantly, we will assume that A represents a set of states that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
An element (or state of belief) in the theory of evidence is represented by a probability distribution over the power set of A, P(A). That is, a state m is m :
There is an additional proviso that is typically applied, namely that every state m satisfies
sr.c-0
and is zero for A = 0. This is the so called "Dempster Rule of Combination."
The problem with this definition is that the denominator in (2a) might be zero, so that (m1 ED m2)(A) is undefined. That is, there exist pairs m1 and m2 such that the combination of m1 and m2 is not defined. This, of course, is not a very satisfactory situation for a binary operation on a space. The solution which is frequently taken is to avoid combining such elements. An alternative is to add an additional element mo to the space: mo(A) = 0 for A '* 0, mo(0) = 1.
Note that this additional element does not satisfy the condition m (0) = 0. Then define, as a special case,
The binary operation is then defined for all pairs m 1, mz. The special element mo is an absorbent state, in the sense that moEDm = memo= mo for all states m. Definition 1: We define (.M ,ED), the space of belief states, by .M = {m satisfying ( 1a) and (lb)} .u {m0}, and define ED by (2a) when the denominator in (2a) is nonzero, and by (2b) otherwise.
• The set .M, together with the combination operation ED, constitutes a monoid, since the binary operation is closed and associative, and there is an identity element. In fact, the binary operation is commutative, so we can say that the space is an abelian monoid.
Still, because of the normalization and the special case in the definition of ED, the monoid .M 137 is both ugly and cumbersome. It makes better sense to dispense with the normalization. We have 
if m (0) '* 1, and V m = m0 otherwise. A computation shows that V preserves the binary operation; i.e., V(m1ED'm2) = V(ml)eV(mz).
Thus V is a homomorphism. Further, V is onto, since for m E .M , the same m is in .M ', and V m = m. The algebraic terminology is that V is an epimorphism of monoids, a fact which we record in
V maps homomorphic:ally from (.M',e') onto (.M,e).
• A "representation" is a term that refers to a map that is an epimorphism of structures. Intuitively, such a map is important because it allows us to consider combination in the space formed by the range of the map as combinations of preimage elements. Lemma 1 will eventually form a small part of a representation to be defined in the next section.
In the case in point, we see that combination can be done without a normalization factor. If it is required to combine elements in .M, one can perform the combinations in .M ', and project to .M by V after all of the combinations are completed. In terms of the Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence, this result says that the normalization in the combination formula is essentially irrelevant, and that combining can be handled by Equation (3) in place of Equation (2a).
Spaces of Opinions of Experts
In this section, we introduce two new spaces, based on the opinions of sample spaces of experts, and discuss the evaluation of statistics of experts opinions.
Finally, w_ e interpret the combination rules in' these spaces as being a form of Bayesian updating. In the following section we will show that these spaces also map homomorphically onto the space of belief states. We begin by giving a formal introduction to the spaces of expert and their methods of combination.
Opinions of Experts
We consider a set c of "experts", together with a map 1.1. giving a weight or strength for each expert. It is convenient to think of c as a large but finite set, although the essential restriction is that c should be a measure space. Each expert wE c maintains a list of possible labels: Dempster uses the notation r(w) for this subset; i.e., r(w )CA. Here we will assume that each expert w has more than just a subset of possibilities r( (I) ) ' but also a probabilistic opinion
Pw defined on A, such that Pw(A) is a probability distribution over A EA. 
li.EA
If an expert w believes that a label A is possible, i.e., A E r ( w ), then the associated probability estimate p .,(;\.) will be nonzero. Conversely, if w thinks that A is impossible (U r ( w)), then Pw(A) ;= 0. We also include the possibility that expert w has no opinion which is indicated by the special element p w !!!! 0. This state is included in order to ensure that the binary operation, to be defined later, is closed. We denote the collection of probabilistic opinions { p., I wEt } by P.
It will turn out that the central point in the theory of evidence is that the p �.�� (A) data is used only in terms of test for zero. Specifically, we
Note that x�.�� is the characteristic function of the set r(w) over A, i.e., x�.�� (A.) = 1 iff AEr(w).
The collection of all x �.�� 's will be denoted by X, and will be called the boolean opinions of the experts e.
If we regard the space of experts e as a sample space, then each x�.�� (A) can be regarded as a sample of a random (boolean) variable x(A).
In a similar way, the Pw(A)'s are also samples Qf random variables p (A.). In the next section, we will define the state of the system will be defined We are now ready to introduce the spaces which we will term "opinions of experts." The central point is that the set of labels A is fixed, but that the set of experts c can be different for 
Definition 3:
The space of boolean opinions of experts, ()1',0), is defined by:
X= { x,,, }wE!, Xw: A� {0,1} 'v'w}.
If (thJ.LhX0 and (t2,J.L2,X 2 ) arc clements in )1', define their product 
AEA.
Given a space of experts t and the boolean opinions X, we define (JJ,®), (JJ' ,0), (.M ',e'), and (.M ,e). We will now show that these four spaces are closely related. It is not hard to show that the binary operation is, in all four cases, commutative and associative, and that each space has an identity clement, so that these spaces are abelian monoids. We also have • We claim that T and U preserve the binary operations. More formally, we show that T and U are homomorphisms of monoids. However, proofs arc omitted here; we refer the interested reader to the larger report [12] . 
An Alternative Method for Combining Evidence
With the viewpoint that the theory of evidence is really simply statistics of opinions of experts, we can make certain remarks on the limitations of the theory.
(1) There is no usc of probabilities or degrees of confidence. Although the belief values seem to give weighted results, at the base of the theory, experts only say whether a condition is possible or not. In particular, the theory makes no distinction between an expert's opinion that a label is likely or that it is remotely possible. Both the second and third limitations come about due to the desire to have a combination formula which factors through to the statistics of the experts and is application-independent. The need for the second limitation, the independence assumption on the sources of evidence, is well known (see, e.g., [13] ). Without incorporating much more complicated models of judgements under multiple sources of knowledge, we can hardly expect anything better.
The first objection, however, suggests an alternate formulation which makes use of the probabilistic assessments of the experts. Basically, the idea is to keep track of the density distributions of the opinions in probability space. Of course, complete representation of the distribution would amount to recording the full set of opinions p w for all w. Instead, it is more reasonable to approximate the distribution by some parameterization, and update the distribution parameters by combination formulas.
We present a formulation based on normal distributions of logarithms of updating coefficients. Other formulations are possible. In marked contrast to the Dempster/Shafer formulation, we assume that all opinions of all experts are nonzero for every label. That is, instead of converting opinions into boolean statements by test for zero, we will assume that all the values are nonzero, and model the 141 distribution of their strengths.
In a manner similar to [14] , set
where Prob(A Is;) is a probability of label A being the correct labeling, among labeling situations, conditioned on some information s1 shared by the collection of experts t1• (Note, incidentally, that the L (A Is;) values are not the so-called "log likelihood ratios"; in particular, they can be both positive and negative). Using some fairly standard assumptions in Bayesian updating, (see (14] ), we obtain
where c is a constant independent of A (but not of s1,
The consequence of this formula is that if certain independence assumptions hold, and if Prob(A) and L(Aist) are known for all A and i, then the approximate values Prob(A lsl> · · · ,sk) can be determined.
Accordingly, we introduce a space which we term "logarithmic opinions of experts." For convenience, we will assume that experts have equal weights. An element in this space will consist of a set of experts t1, and a collection of Note that the experts in t1 all have knowledge of the information s1, and that the estimated logarithmic coefficients L (:\. Is;) can be positive or negative. In fact, since the experts do not necessarily have precise knowledge of the value of Prob(:\.), but instead provide estimates of log's of ratios, the estimates can lie in an unbounded range.
Combination in the space of logarithmic opinions of experts is defined much the same as our earlier combination formulas, except that now consensus opinions are derived by adding component opinions. Specifically, the combination of (tl>Yv and U 2 ,Y 2 ) is (t1xt 2 ,Y), where and Next, in analogy with our map to a statistical space (Section 3.2), we can define a space which might be termed the "parameterized statistics of logarithmic opinions of experts." Elements in this space will consist of pairs (u,C), where u will be a mean vector in 1Rn and C is a symmetric n by n covariance matrix. To project from the space of logarithmic opinions to the space of parameterized statistics, define u, to be the average value of y.,('A1) over wEe, where A= {'Ah · · • ,'An} is a fixed ordering of the clements in the label set. Then the vector u is defined by u = (uh · · · ,un)· Likewise, define c11 as the average value of (y.,('A1)-u1)·(y.,(>.. 1)-uJ) over wEG, and set C equal to the matrix whose l,j-th component is given by Cfj• Combinations in the space of statistics must be defined in such a way that the map from the collections of op1n1ons to the mean and covariance& forms a homomorphism. We are led, after some calculation, to the definition: 
1• 1
The a posteriori probability of a label >.. 142
. This ellipse describes a "one sigma" variation in the distribution, representing a region of uncertainty of the logarithmic opinions; the distribution to two standard deviations lies in a similar but enlarged ellipse. The eigenvalues of C give the squared lengths of the semi-major axes of the ellipse, and are accordingly proportional to degrees of confidence in the corresponding directions.
Bias by the prior probabilities simply adds a fixed vector, with components log[Prob(>.. 1)], to the ellipse, thereby translating the distribution. We seek an axis j such that the components YJ of the vectors y lying in the translated ellipse are relatively much larger than other components of vectors in the ellipse. In this case, the preponderant evidence is for label >.. 1• Clearly, the combination formula is extremely simple.
Its greatest advantage over the Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence is that only O (n2 ) values are required to describe a state, as opposed to the zn values used for a mass distribution in .M. The simplicity and reduction in numbers of parameters has been purchased at the expense of an assumption about the kinds of distributions that can be expected. However, the same assumption allows us to track probabilistic opinions (or actually, the logarithms), instead of converting all opinions into boolean statements about possibilities. 
